react to the data and projections presented 47 in written discussions and graphical displays (as, for example, in the 48 IPCC summaries for policymakers).
49
Our goal in this experiment is to investigate climate negotiators' 50 reactions to climate scientific uncertainty and the way it is presented.
51
We address this problem by centring the experiment on a central 
Q.3
The respondents
81
were not given any information about the emission pathway in the 82 period 2030-2100. Thus, they were free to report probabilities that 83 reflected both their beliefs about future emissions and about the 84 resulting evolution of the temperature. The future deemed most 85 likely is that of 2100 temperature increases of 2-3
• C, followed event. This low probability assigned to the <2 • C scenario is in stark 1 contrast with the stated goal of the Paris agreement that emphasized 2 the need to limit temperature increases to be 'well below 2 • C' . MBA 3 students reported similar prior distributions ( Supplementary Fig. 5 ).
Q.4 4
The conditional probabilities and the provided scientific information.
12
In contrast, active negotiators' and MBA students' distance between 13 conditional probabilities and scientific information is independent 14 of their confidence level (see Supplementary Fig. 1 ).
15
The negotiators reported conditional probabilities that were 16 more distant from the scientific information than the non- Acad. Sci. USA 111, 13664-13671 (2014 Information 8 we report the full questionnaire used in the survey). formats. This provides greater accuracy but lower treatment effects than a 33 within-subjects design. When we asked policymakers for the second round of 34 estimates of the probability distribution over possible 2100 temperature increases,
35
we instructed them to consider the specified emission pathway as given, to isolate 36 the impact of climate uncertainty alone. In both rounds of probability elicitation,
37
we asked policymakers to report their level of confidence in their estimates.
38
In that n > 2 events sum to a probability > 1 may be driven by a bias toward the 'case 118 partition' ignorance prior of 1/2 for each event (see Fox and Rottenstreich 30 ).
119
We found no significant differences between the COP21 and MBA students' 120 samples in terms of the additivity of their probability estimates of either 121 distributions (priors and conditional probabilities).
122
For the purpose of our analyses we normalized the four subjective probabilities
123
given by each individual to add up to 100%. Our main findings are robust to the 124 exclusion of subadditive observations for either priors or conditional probabilities.
125
For more information, see Supplementary Table 5 , where we test the robustness of 126 results presented to the use of raw data rather than normalized data.
127
Difference across formats. Figure 4 and Supplementary Fig. 7 report for each 128 temperature bin the proportion of respondents whose reported conditional 129 probability is closer to the scientific information than the corresponding prior.
130
Respondents were asked to judge the provided information along two 131 dimensions, credibility and informativeness. 
